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Abstract  
The study of government surveillance is continually important as new policies are made or the 
extent of the surveillance leaked to the public. Earlier research has found that there is a 
relationship between people’s perception of a threat to public security with their approval of 
such government surveillance. My study intends to answer how and in what way the threat is 
related to approval rates. I present two separate arguments to this original relationship. One, 
that the relationship is moderated through geographical proximity where smaller distances 
between the threat and respondent yield higher approval rates. Two, that the relationship is 
mediated through interpersonal trust or governmental trust which has a negative effect on the 
relationship. Different from most surveillance studies this paper operationalizes the threat as 
organized sexual assaults rather than terrorism which I argue is important as terrorism is a 
very unlikely event. By conducting an experiment this paper indicates that geographical 
proximity does not yield the predicted results. I was unable to find the relationship between 
threat and approval rates and thus unable to test the mediators. This suggests that the non-
terror threat is not important for the study. Replications of the experiment are needed to 
validate and generalize the results.  
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interpersonal trust, governmental trust 
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1. Introduction 
Government surveillance, i.e. the act of a government who systematically monitors and 
collects more or less sensitive information about its citizens, is prominent in the western 
democracies of today. Events such as the creation of WikiLeaks and the leakage of the 
“Snowden files” give some indication of the range and depth of some governments’ 
surveillance policies. These events highlight the need for scrutiny and questioning of such 
surveillance and people’s approval of it.  
 
A theoretical baseline is that government surveillance embodies the notion of the social 
contract based on scholars such as Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau. The contract-theory 
concerns the origin and the legitimacy of the state and argues that individuals have freely 
consented to submit to the rule and authority of the head of state, resulting in losing some of 
their sovereignty and freedoms in the process (Weller, 2012). In exchange the citizen gains 
welfare benefits and their remaining freedoms protected by the state along with security from 
foreign powers. This requires some form of government surveillance for the state to know 
who needs protection and from what, who needs welfare provisions and where they can be 
found (Weller, 2012). A modern version of the contract suggests that citizens may accept such 
surveillance, conditional on the transparency and accountability of the government (Weller, 
2012). The citizen thus wants the ability to scrutinize the government and its actions and, if 
deemed unfit, have the power to change those policies. The topic of government surveillance 
is therefore continually important as new policies are made or information about the extent of 
the surveillance leaked to the public.  
 
This paper conducts an experiment testing the relationship between perceiving a threat to 
national security
1
 and the approval or disapproval of government surveillance. My research 
question is: How and in what way is a perceived threat to public security correlated with the 
approval of surveillance methods such as CCTV, cellphone- and Internet surveillance? I am 
thus studying geographical proximity as an interaction effect and interpersonal and 
governmental trust as causal mechanisms. Different from most previous studies I am also 
testing whether a non-terrorist threat is related to surveillance approval rates. The theoretical 
framework is based on previous surveillance studies combined with psychological theories of 
how individuals are emotionally affected by a threat. 
                                                     
1
 “National  security” and “public security” will in this paper be used as synonyms. 
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The modern form of government surveillance has its roots in the industrial revolution and has 
since then undergone an extensive surveillance expansion (Weller, 2012). In recent times, the 
events of 9/11 can arguably have caused an intensification in already existing (but largely 
hidden) forms of government surveillance (Monahan, 2012: Lyon, 2001). Previous studies in 
the surveillance field have therefore mainly had terrorism as the focal point (see e.g. Davis & 
Silver, 2004: Huddy, Feldman, Taber & Lahav, 2005: Monahan, 2012). However, terrorist 
attacks are rare in Western democracies which highlight the need to study other threats to 
public security. I therefore argue that other more common threats (although exceptional on a 
large scale) should be studied. In this paper, that threat will be operationalized as organized 
forms of sexual assaults committed on a scale large enough to warrant more government 
surveillance.  
 
Davis and Silver (2004) show that when individuals perceive an increase in threat to national 
security they are more approving of government surveillance. This also seem reversible; if the 
threat is not perceived as imminent or extensive enough, people will continue to be restrictive 
towards government surveillance (Bjereld & Oscarsson, 2014). Additionally, Bjereld and 
Oscarsson (2014:483) have identified a research gap which requires further studies; that how 
and in what way the two variables of threat to national security and public approval of 
surveillance are correlated has not been established. With basis in previous studies (e.g. 
Thoresen, Aakvaag, Wentzel-Larsen, Dyb & Hjemdal, 2012) and with psychological theories 
(such as construal-level theory) I argue that this relationship is modified through geographical 
proximity, that when the threat occurs closer to the individual he/she will be more affected by 
it and thus more approving of government surveillance. I argue that this interaction variable 
should be given more attention in surveillance studies than it has previously.  
 
I argue that a causal mechanism to the initial relationship is interpersonal trust as Huddy et 
al.’s (2003) study shows that a large scale threat such as 9/11 can lead to increased feelings of 
fear and anxiety which promotes social dislocation (lower interpersonal trust). This in turn 
increases the approval rates of surveillance as anxious citizens wants to increase their sense of 
security. An alternative causal mechanism of governmental trust is also analyzed as Davis and 
Silver (2004) have found it to be important to the original relationship between threat and 
approval. Additionally Huddy et al. (2003) suggest that a threat would temporarily decrease 
the governmental trust and force the government to take action against the threat along with 
trying to increase the people’s support of those actions.  
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Additionally, the Swedish SOM-institute has shown over three separate time-periods (2002, 
2008 and 2013) that the approval of government surveillance methods differ across different 
methods. The mixed trend shows a more restrictive approach towards cellphone- and Internet 
surveillance but a small, significant accepting approach towards CCTV (Bjereld & Oscarsson, 
2014). Additionally, the surveillance systems are governed by different laws and have 
different inherent characteristics so I therefore argue that government surveillance practices 
should be measured separately.  
 
Finally, much of the surveillance studies are focused on the U.S. and the U.K. but to what 
extent can those results actually be generalized? I argue that these are exceptional cases as 
these countries have clear-cut threats towards their national security whereas smaller countries 
such as Sweden with lower threat-levels could be the typical case with higher generalizability. 
I argue that Sweden is an interesting case to test the relationship in due to generally low levels 
of crime including no major terrorist attacks which might warrant an increase in government 
surveillance. A low threat-level to Sweden’s national security thus should indicate that the 
concern regarding crime and the individuals’ safety is low generating lower approval rates of 
government surveillance than in countries with higher threat-levels. This is strengthened by 
the SOM-institute which has shown that Swedes in general have low approval rates of 
government surveillance (Bjereld & Oscarsson, 2014). In the meantime Sweden has very high 
levels of government surveillance as exposed by the “Snowden files” where the National 
Defense Radio Establishment (FRA) on several occasions worked closely with other 
European intelligence agencies and the National Security Agency (NSA) in the United States 
(Privacy International, 2014). I argue that this discrepancy makes Sweden an interesting case 
as low approval rates of government surveillance arguably should not coincide with an actual 
high rate of surveillance, something which is probably true for many other countries as well. 
The results regarding approval rates, non-terrorist threat, geographical proximity and causal 
mechanisms should therefore be generalizable to other countries with similar characteristics 
as described above.  
 
This paper will first discuss previous research and theories concluding my own hypothesis. 
The following sections will then present the research method and design, including reflections 
regarding the data collection, experimental treatment, dependent variable and the 
experimental questionnaire. I then present the results and analysis, finishing with my 
discussion and conclusions.  
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2. Previous research and theoretical framework 
Most surveillance studies are based on the precursors of George Orwell’s 1984 and Michel 
Foucault’s (and Jeremy Bentham’s) Panopticon, with the notion on how the few (in the 
government) can watch the many (the citizens) (Orwell, 1949; Foucault, 1977).  I however 
base my results on more psychological theories regarding the emotional response invoked in 
the respondents’ after perceiving a threat. I argue that these can be important when trying to 
understand what motivates approval for government surveillance.    
 
Additionally, the literature proposes at least two prominent views of government surveillance. 
One is a neutral approach where a state needs surveillance due to organizational necessity as 
described by the social contract. The neutral approach also states that any kind of systematic 
information gathering should be considered surveillance (Fuchs, 2011:135). Another view is a 
negative approach where governments conduct surveillance trying to achieve power over 
those being surveilled or even discipline behavior deemed unwanted (Fuchs, 2011:135). This 
paper uses the second approach where surveillance is used as an instrument of power to 
counteract threats to national security and is thus inherently intrusive upon those being 
surveilled. This decision is based on Fuchs’ (2011:136) discussion regarding the origin of the 
term surveillance, which is French for “watching over something”, which implies a hierarchy. 
He also states that a neutral approach might legitimize coercive forms of surveillance and that 
if everything is surveillance it is difficult to politically criticize it. 
 
2.1. Government surveillance as a response to a threat 
There are several ways in which an increase in threat to national security could lead to an 
increase of government surveillance. One of these is the theory of “the normalization of the 
exceptional” which is divided into two subcategories: the normalization of the threat, and the 
normalization of the means of response (Flyghed, 2002). The first is achieved by continually 
portraying the threat as imminent due to media coverage of sensational news. This ultimately 
leads to indifference or acceptance by the people when the government proposes increased 
surveillance (Flyghed, 2002). If prescribing to the view of surveillance as an instrument of 
power this indifference suggests that governments unhindered could increase the control of its 
citizens. The normalization of the means of response occurs in two ways, either by a spill-
over effect where exceptional methods are used in less exceptional situations, or by the police 
stretching their allowed limits which requires new legislation in retrospect to legitimize their 
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actions (Flyghed, 2002).  This suggests that even in non-terrorist threats the governmental 
reaction might be equally extensive which warrants my usage of terrorism-related theories in 
non-terrorist events.   
 
Another way in which surveillance-approval might be dependent on a threat is through 
psychological effects. Huddy et al. (2005) claims there are two ways in which people who 
perceive a terrorist-threat might respond. One is that the threat might lead to increased 
feelings of anxiety which increases people’s risk aversion and lowers their support for over-
seas military actions in fear of retaliation (although still support domestic security policies 
such as surveillance (Huddy et al., 2003)). Another is that the threat might increase feelings of 
vengeance and promote animosity towards those they perceive to have carried out the threat 
which in turn increases approval of governmental security policies. Both approaches tend to 
favor domestic governmental surveillance, but I will focus on the first approach as I argue that 
a threat will increase the respondents’ sense of worry regarding their safety. This is also the 
“manipulation check” which discerns whether the treatment in the experiment gave any effect 
or not. 
 
A traditional approach in the surveillance literature is to think of government surveillance as a 
trade-off between security and privacy where an increase in security inherently means a 
decrease in privacy. This paradigm is given support by Davis and Silver’s (2004) study as 
they find a negative correlation between people’s threat perception and support for civil 
liberties such as privacy. This combined with the findings from Huddy et al. (2003, 2005) 
suggests that a threat would increase the approval for government surveillance even if 
surveillance is inherently intrusive. Noteworthy is that that not all agree with the theory of 
security and privacy as a trade-off, e.g. Pavone and Degli Esposti (2010) who show that 
“…concerned citizens saw their privacy being infringed without having their security 
enhanced, whilst trusting citizens saw their security being increased without their privacy 
being affected” (Pavone & Degli Esposti, 2010:556). This suggests that further research is 
necessary. It would be interesting to study in what way the respondents perceive the 
government surveillance, but here I have solely focused on the respondents’ approval rates 
regardless of their view of surveillance. Replications of this experiment could therefore 
include that variable but would need to modify the research question.  
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My two hypotheses (H1 and H2) are based on the relationship in Model 1 between perceiving 
a threat to national security and wanting more government surveillance as determined by 
previous research (Huddy et al., 2005: Bjereld & Oscarsson, 2014; Davis & Silver, 2004). I 
expect my results to be similar to theirs meaning that non-terrorist threats are still important 
for approval rates. In H1 I vary the independent variable to discern cause and effect. In H2 I 
propose causal mechanisms within this relationship. If prescribing to the view of the trade-off, 
the relationship can be described as; “when the Swedish respondents perceive the need for 
security to increase due to a threat, they will have higher approval of government surveillance 
regardless of its intrusion on privacy”.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2. Construal-level theory on geographical proximity 
Psychological studies have analyzed the effect on proximity between an event and the 
individual’s emotional response. Fujita, Henderson, Eng, Trope and Liberman (2006) have 
examined how individuals perceive the same social event depending on the geographical 
distance between the location of the event and the individual. Their study is based on the 
construal-level theory (CLT) which states that increasing distance socially and time-wise 
between event and individual leads the individual to recollect the event by a their abstract 
features (high-level construal) rather than their concrete features (low-level construal). Fujita 
et al.’s (2006) experiments suggest that CLT can be applied to geographical distance since 
respondents tended to use a more abstract language when recalling events that occurred 
further away compared to closer events. I therefore argue that the further away something 
happens the less people will care about it, that they perceive the threat as more abstract and 
not really a concern to his or her own safety. Altruistic individuals might still care about the 
threat but likely will not agree to become subject to further government surveillance if they 
don’t perceive a similar threat in their own area.   
 
When the threat is terrorism Schlenger et al. (2002) have found that after 9/11 the occurrence 
of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) was substantially higher in the metropolitan areas of 
Perceived threats to public 
security increases 
Higher public approval of 
government surveillance 
Model 1: 
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New York than elsewhere in the U.S.. Thoresen, et al. (2012) have studied the emotional 
responses of Norwegians after the terror attacks in Oslo and Utöya. By comparing the 
emotional responses of citizens in Oslo with other Norwegians their results show that fear 
responses were higher among the Oslo-residents. Overall both studies suggest that 
geographical proximity to a large scale threat could be an important predictor of distress. I 
argue that similar results might be found in circumstances other than terrorism if the threat is 
imminent and large enough to engage people who fear for their security. I therefore argue that 
the treatment used in this experiment should increase levels of fear or worry about being 
subjected to a crime. 
 
The first hypothesis (H1) in model 2 states that geographical proximity is an interaction 
variable in the original relationship between the independent and dependent variable. This 
means that the strength of the original relationship is dependent on the third variable. I argue 
that the closer the threat occurs to the individual the more approving he/she will be of 
government surveillance of said area that the threat occurred in. In other words, when a threat 
occurs at a national level in the “Home”-country the citizens of that country will be more 
accepting of surveillance in the “Home”-country rather than if the same threat occurred at a 
national level in the “Foreign”-country.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.3. Social dislocation and governmental distrust after a threat 
My second hypothesis (H2) suggests that interpersonal trust is an important causal mechanism 
in the relationship between perceiving a threat to national security and approval of 
government surveillance. Huddy et al. (2003) argues through psychological theories that fear 
induced by terrorism tend to isolate individuals and destabilize basic features of modern 
society. This social dislocation as a response to a terrorist attack distances the citizens from 
Perceived threats to public 
security increases 
Higher public approval of 
government surveillance 
Model 2 (H1): 
Geographical proximity 
to the threat 
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each other and from their government. In their studies of emotional responses after 9/11 
Huddy et al. (2003) find that fearful individuals were also approving of domestic government 
surveillance which would increase citizens’ safety without antagonizing the enemy. The 
interpersonal trust would therefore be a mediator between perceiving a threat and wanting 
more governmental surveillance.  
 
Davis and Silver (2004) pose an alternative hypothesis; that governmental trust is an 
interaction effect in the relationship. They find that the less people trust their government, the 
less approving they will be of government surveillance. Another view is that governmental 
trust is a causal mechanism as it is essential for governments to respond quickly in the face of 
a terrorist threat or otherwise lose public support (Huddy et al., 2003). This suggests that a 
threat would (temporarily) decrease the public’s governmental trust which would force the 
government to increase their efforts in defending the public security by increasing 
surveillance along with the public’s approval rates of said surveillance. The experiment 
allows me to only test one interaction effect so governmental trust will therefore be treated as 
an alternative causal mechanism to contrast interpersonal trust. 
 
Model 3 adds interpersonal trust as a mediating variable which the original relationship is 
dependent on. This means that the original relationship should fall away when adding the new 
variable indicating that the relationship only exists through that variable. H2 is thus that an 
increase in threat to national security should lower interpersonal trust which leads to higher 
surveillance approval for the citizens of that country. The correlation between the independent 
variable and the mediator is negative as a threat induces fear in the individual which 
negatively affect interpersonal trust. Such social dislocation would increase the approval rates 
of surveillance as individuals are distrustful of others. The alternative causal mechanism of 
governmental trust is also analyzed with the same negative correlation as I argue that an 
increase in threat lowers the people’s governmental trust which forces governments to 
increase their security measures which would increase fearful individual’s approval rates.   
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3. Research method and design 
H1 and H2 require different research and analyzation methods. The hypothesis of 
geographical proximity (H1) requires an experiment which manipulates and varies the 
independent variable to see any predictable patterns in the dependent variable. This allows me 
to discern cause and effect in a controlled environment. If there are any differences between 
the experiment groups in the dependent variable of approval of government surveillance I can 
state that the treatment of geographical proximity had effect. The hypothesis regarding causal 
mechanisms (H2) do not in strict terms require an experiment but for the sake of simplicity 
uses the same data as H1. Due to time and budget limitations the experiment is an “only 
after”-design without any previous contact with the respondents. This design has the 
disadvantage of being unable to fully rule out that any differences between the groups in 
approval rates are due to the treatment (Esaiasson, Gilljam, Oscarsson & Wägnerud, 
2012:332). The advantage is that the respondents are not exposed to the survey questions 
before which might affect their answers. 
 
The experiment is conducted with LORE and the Citizen Panel which has a self-recruited 
database of ca 60,000 respondents who four times a year answer survey experiments or panel 
studies regarding the social sciences (Gothenburg University, n.d.). An experiment requires 
randomly selected and randomly assigned respondents to rule out the possibility that the 
results depend on systematical differences between the groups (Esaiasson et al., 2012:94). The 
sample of respondents in my experiment are therefore randomly selected from the database 
and randomly assigned to either treatment- or control group.  
 
The external validity of experimental studies weakens when the respondents are not a 
representative sample of the population as a whole (Esaiasson et al., 2012:341). Additionally, 
Perceived threats to public 
security increases 
Higher public approval of 
government surveillance 
Model 3 (H2): 
Decrease in interpersonal 
trust 
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the respondents in the Citizen Panel answer similar studies frequently and know that their 
answers are measured which may affect the results and lower the generalizability. The sample 
of respondents in my experiment is thus stratified on the respondents’ sex, age and education 
level which generates 100% representativity in regards to these variables which lowers the 
statistical margin of error (Esaiasson et al, 2012:178). Additionally, the sample contains 
mostly opt-in respondents but is mixed with some random probability selection from a 
population sample (Martinsson, Andreasson & Markstedt, 2016) which heightens the 
generalizability. The external validity would increase with replications of the experiment with 
new respondents, experiment- and control groups but with the same treatment (Esaiasson et 
al., 2012:334).  Due to the stratified selection and random assignment the experiment should 
thus give sound external validity, but should be replicated to further establish the results.  
 
The internal validity of the experiment depends on the operationalization of the variables used 
when explaining the dependent variable. A bad operationalization entails that the results were 
not the valid answers to the research questions (Esaiasson et al., 2012:342). In this study, 
there should be a high validity of the operationalization of approval of government 
surveillance, interpersonal and governmental trust as these are based on previous research. 
The variables of a non-terrorist threat and geographical proximity are not as commonly 
studied in this context which might lower the internal validity. This warrants the need to 
replicate the study regardless of the results as others might suggest better operationalizations.   
 
3.1. Data 
The data was collected between April 21 and May 4 2016 together with two other 
experiments. My experiment was sent to 4,000 people with 1,000 respondents randomly 
assigned to each treatment and control group. 2,734 people opened the link to the experiment, 
but only 2,656 answered the questions. Those who did not complete the survey are not part of 
the analysis. The control group had 710 respondents, the Egyptian group 665 respondents, the 
German group 650 respondents and the Swedish group 631 respondents. A total of 2,640 
respondents completed the questions regarding the dependent variable of government 
surveillance approval. The response rate was overall (including those who did not finish the 
survey) 68.4%. Excluding the missing cases the response rate was 66.4%. These overall 
results regarding the respondents are also published in the technical report from LORE 
(Martinsson et al., 2016). This high response rate provides increased stability of the results as 
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they are more likely to be a reflection of the true situation outside the experiment (provided 
that the random selection and assignment was successful). 
 
When conducting several experiments together like in the Citizen Panel there is a risk of 
“spill-over”-effects between the experiments as respondents can remember treatments from 
other studies when answering my questions. My experiment was placed last which could have 
affected the results if e.g. the respondents started to grow tired of the survey. The other two 
experiments were about election pledges and welfare support which also might have affected 
my results. Replications of the experiment should therefore randomize the order of the studies 
to remove any spill-over effects.  
 
The data is collected in the interesting case of Sweden due to its high levels of government 
surveillance even in the face of relative low levels of crime, characteristics which I argue to 
be typical for many other countries as well. This discrepancy is highly interesting as an 
overall principle regarding all forms of Swedish government surveillance is the principle of 
proportionality which states that the interest of conducting surveillance in order to prevent 
crime must outweigh the individual’s interest of not being surveilled (SFS 2013:460). The 
fact that Sweden seems to have very high levels of government surveillance despite the 
principle of proportionality suggests a widespread worry from the legislators regarding attacks 
towards the national security.  
 
Naarttijärvi (2013) argues that these high levels of government surveillance depend on the 
Swedish legislators who today are more focused on preventive measures than ever before. 
Any secret surveillance has to be approved by a court, but SFS 2007:979 states that such 
surveillance can be implemented if there is a “particular reason to assume” that the person will 
commit an illegal action. SFS 2008:717 established signals intelligence on a much larger scale 
than ever before which gave FRA permission to collect strategically important data from all 
telephone and data traffic crossing the Swedish border. Privacy International (2014) has 
expressed concerns regarding these acts and states that the now large scale collection of data 
by FRA is elevating the agency to an increasingly important actor in the global intelligence 
network. Regarding more “open” forms of surveillance such as camera surveillance of public 
spaces (SFS 2013:460) there is a specified duty to inform the public of the cameras by distinct 
signs. Such signs can be seen as a way to clear suspicions of any hidden agenda from the 
government but also that the government considers crime to be a choice committed by 
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informed citizens and that people who have made “the right choice” have per definition 
nothing to fear from the surveillance (Björklund, 2011). This apparent increase of surveillance 
in the face of low approval rates, along with the different laws regarding the surveillance 
methods warrant the need for separate analyses of the dependent variables.  
 
3.2. Treatment 
In my experiment there are three treatment groups who read a newspaper article about the 
same sort of threat to public security but with different geographical context. Afterwards both 
treatment- and control groups are given the same questions regarding their approval of several 
different methods of government surveillance. The control group is only given the 
questionnaire without being predisposed to any threat to public security or any geographical 
location which will make the control group as similar to the treatment groups as possible. I am 
not using a “control-treatment”-text without the threat or geographical location as I argue that 
that might lead the respondents to react to something other than what my hypothesis has 
stated which would lower the internal validity of the study.  
 
As stated in the introduction, the definition of “threat” to public security is a type of violence 
that occurs in a public space but without terrorist connections. In addition, the threat needs to 
be large enough to engage a significant amount of citizens and to warrant a more extensive 
government surveillance apparatus. With regards to my interaction variable of geographical 
proximity the threat should also be universal, meaning that it could happen in both the 
“Home”- and in the “Foreign”-country. The events used to operationalize “threat to public 
security” is therefore the sexual assaults that took place in 2014 and 2015 at the festival We 
Are STHLM in Stockholm, the sexual assaults in Cologne during New Year’s Eve 2015, and 
the sexual assaults at the Tahrir-square in Cairo during the inauguration of the new Egyptian 
president 2014. These three were chosen because the threats share similar characteristics but 
were conducted in different geographical contexts. They also occurred quite recently which 
according to CLT is important for the individual’s perception of the threat. By having two 
“non-Swedish” events with different levels of geographical proximity to the Swedish 
respondents I can analyze more variation. The choice of countries, however, was unable to be 
based on theory as previous studies have only studied the effect of a threat in a city compared 
to that country’s general population which might affect the internal validity of the study. In 
accordance with my hypothesis, the Swedish respondents should want more government 
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surveillance in Sweden after reading the Stockholm-text rather than after reading the 
Cologne- or Cairo-text. It is possible that the threat of sexual assaults will affect the women of 
the experiment groups more than men as the victims of the texts were women. This will be 
controlled for in the analysis.  
 
A common critique towards experimental studies is that they are too calculated and not a good 
representation of real events which undermines the possibility of drawing any conclusions 
from the experiment which holds in the real world (Esaiasson et al., 2012:95). The treatment 
texts are therefore loosely based on real-life news articles
2
 but refined so as not to contain any 
different material which would generate later difficulties in analyzing the results. The only 
differences in the texts are therefore the geographical location and the context (festival, New 
Year’s Eve, inauguration) where the latter varies in order to still refer to a real-life threat. 
Arguably the real-life connection is important for the respondents to know that there exists a 
realistic threat which might affect their security and motivate an extended surveillance 
apparatus. The information given in the treatment texts are the following; the nature of the 
crimes, the organized behavior of the offenders, that threat occurred in public spaces, critique 
of the police for not doing enough, critique of the media for not reporting the events sooner 
and the promise by local authorities to do everything in their power to not have such events 
happen again. These characteristics were chosen because they combine information from all 
three of the original articles and thus make the “fake” articles realistic in terms of universality 
– that the threat could occur in any of the three countries. I don’t see any possible ethical 
issues with the treatment as these events were something heavily discussed in the media 
earlier this year. 
 
The following section includes the text used for the three treatment groups. Before the 
treatment groups were divided into each subgroup (Sweden/Germany/Egypt) they read the 
following statement: “Du kommer nu att få läsa en nedkortad variant av en artikel som 
förekommit i dagspressen. Vänligen läs texten och svara sedan på efterföljande frågor.” 
                                                     
2
 Wierup, L. & Bouvin, E. (2016-01-10). Övergreppen på festival rapporterades aldrig vidare. Dagens Nyheter. Retrieved 
2016-03-21 from http://www.dn.se/nyheter/sverige/overgreppen-pa-festivalen-i-stockholm-rapporterades-aldrig-vidare/ 
 
Kennedy, M. & Hankins, M. (2016-01-10). Vittnen: 1000 män löpte amok – 30 kvinnor sextrakasserade. Göteborgsposten. 
Retrieved 2016-03-21 from http://m.gp.se/nyheter/varlden/1.2947724-vittnen-1000-man-lopte-amok-30-kvinnor-
sextrakasserade 
 
Majlard, J. (2014-06-10). Sexövergrepp upprör Egypten. Retrieved 2016-03-22 from http://www.svd.se/sexovergrepp-
uppror-egypten-2n6T  
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Afterwards, each of the three groups read one version of the text as described by the 
parentheses.
3
  
 
Sexövergrepp upprör (Sverige/Tyskland/Egypten)  
Publicerad 2016-01-10  
 
Övergreppen inträffade (x/x/2014) i samband med (2014 och 2015 års ungdomsfestival We 
Are Sthlm/nyårsfirandet när många människor samlats i området runt 
centralstationen/installationen av president Abdel Fattah al-Sisi när många människor 
hade samlats vid Tahrirtorget) i (Stockholm/Köln/Kairo). Enligt polisen ska ungefär 30 
sexuella övergrepp ha inträffat (runt festivalområdet/x/runt torget) där en grupp på ca 50 
unga män antastat kvinnor genom bl.a. att ta dem på brösten och underlivet. En kvinna ska 
ha utsatts för så grova övergrepp att polisen likställer det med våldtäkt.  
Myndigheter som utreder händelserna rapporterar att trakasserierna tycks ha varit 
organiserade och att de unga männen uppsåtligen riktat in sig på att omringa och ofreda 
unga kvinnor.  
Kritik har riktats mot både polisens bristande kontroll och medias rapportering av 
händelserna eftersom det tog lång tid innan informationen nådde allmänheten. Lokala 
myndigheter försäkrar att allt ska göras för att identifiera de skyldiga och för att liknande 
händelser inte ska kunna upprepas. 
 
3.3. Dependent variable: approval of government surveillance 
As described in the research question the operationalized definition of “government 
surveillance methods” is closed circuit television (CCTV), cellphone- and Internet 
surveillance. These have all previously been included in various surveillance studies and 
include both generalizing and targeting forms of surveillance methods (see e.g. Bjereld & 
Oscarsson, 2014; Pavone & Degli Esposti, 2010). The approval of these different systems is 
measured separately through separate questions in the questionnaire as previous research 
(Bjereld & Oscarsson, 2014) have indicated that there is a mixed trend in approval rates. 
Approval thus means whether or not the respondents agree to a more extensive surveillance 
apparatus by increasing the frequency of each of the three surveillance methods. These 
                                                     
3
 An “x” in the parenthesis indicates that no additional information was given in that version of the text.  
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systems will now be presented shortly as a prelude to the survey questions used to 
operationalize these concepts in the experiment.  
 
The usage of CCTV, i.e. governmental video surveillance of public spaces, differs greatly 
depending on technology and political policies, but the overall aim is to prevent and detect 
criminal activity such as theft or violence (Hempel & Töpfer, 2004:6). From a more 
sociological perspective, CCTV in public spaces can be seen as a tool for social inclusion 
where everyone feels safe, or social exclusion where some are being discriminated (Saetnan, 
Lomell & Wiecek, 2002). This conflict is also represented in the view that CCTV can either 
be perceived as an actual measure taken by the government to ensure its citizens’ safety (that 
someone is looking out for you) or as framing certain areas as unsafe rendering citizens more 
concerned about their safety than before (Wood & Webster, 2009: Kroener & Neyland, 2012). 
As this paper prescribes to the negative view of government surveillance, I argue that CCTV 
entails the government’s ability to screen out behavior that is deemed unwanted. This is 
strengthened by Björklund (2001) who argues that an extensive CCTV usage tend to promote 
the generalization of distrust as everyone is scrutinized the same way, whether or not a person 
is suspected of having committed a crime. 
 
Unlike CCTV, methods of cellphone- and Internet surveillance can be used with a more 
targeting approach in order to intercept communication between individuals. Internet 
surveillance means that governments can access data regarding Internet users’ communication 
and Web browsing activities and retain such data for later purposes. Cellphone surveillance 
can, depending on technological sophistication, identify nearby phones, locate them and 
intercept outgoing calls and text messages (Pell & Soghoian, 2014:11). Since I am 
predisposing the treatment groups to a threat I expect that the results of my experiment will 
overall yield a more accepting approach towards all three of the surveillance methods. 
However, in accordance with earlier research (Bjereld & Oscarsson, 2014) I expect my results 
to show a higher approval rate of CCTV than cellphone-surveillance which in turn is higher 
than Internet-surveillance.  
3.4. Survey questions 
The following section display the survey questions used in the experiment. The word-phrasing 
of these are based on the questions used by the SOM-institute in their reports from 2002, 2008 
and 2013. The questions are presented in the same order as they were to the respondents. The 
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question regarding the respondents’ worry about being subject to crime is asked first as a 
manipulation check which will seize any possible treatment effects. If the respondents have 
perceived the threat then their levels of worry should increase as stated by earlier research 
(Schlenger et al., 2002; Thoresen et al., 2012). Due to H1 of geographical proximity I expect 
the worry about being subjected to crime to be higher in the Swedish treatment group 
followed by the German and the Egyptian group and lastly the control group. This question is 
therefore asked first as the duration effect of the treatment (meaning how long the respondents 
are affected by the threat) should be small as the threat chosen might not be a case of life or 
death for those affected by it but should arguably still increase the level of worry. 
 
Om du ser till din egen situation, hur oroad är du över att bli utsatt för brott i allmänhet? 
Inte alls oroad 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, Mycket oroad 7 
 
In order to test H2 the questionnaire also features questions regarding the causal mechanism 
of interpersonal trust, and the alternative causal mechanism of governmental trust. The 
governmental trust is measured at three levels; trust in cabinet, trust in parliament and trust in 
municipal government as these have different judicial powers. The analysis will test all three 
levels but only present the results from trust regarding the municipal government. 
 
Enligt din mening, i vilken utsträckning går det att lita på människor i allmänhet? 
Det går inte att lita på människor i allmänhet 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, Det går att lita på människor i 
allmänhet 7 
 
Hur stort förtroende har du för det sätt på vilket följande institutioner och grupper sköter sitt 
arbete? 
 
The questionnaire most importantly features the respondent’s approval of the three different 
surveillance methods. In accordance with CLT on the abstract understanding of geographical 
distance between events and the individual I expect that the proximity of threat should lead to 
 
Mycket 
stort 
förtroende 
(1) 
Ganska 
stort 
förtroende 
(2) 
Varken stort 
eller litet 
förtroende 
(3) 
Ganska litet 
förtroende 
(4) 
Mycket litet 
förtroende 
(5) 
Regeringen           
Riksdagen           
Kommunstyrelserna           
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higher levels of approval in the Swedish treatment group, followed by the German, the 
Egyptian and the control group.  
 
I vilken utsträckning anser du att följande metoder bör kunna användas för att motverka hot 
mot Sveriges nationella säkerhet? 
 
Bör aldrig 
kunna 
användas 1 
2 3 4 5 6 
Bör alltid 
kunna 
användas 7 
Kameraövervakning av 
offentliga platser 
              
Telefonavlyssning               
Övervakning av all 
tele- och datatrafik till 
och från Sverige 
              
 
In order to test whether the random assignment was successful I have also gathered 
information such as the respondents’ sex, age and residential area. As stated before, I expect 
that women might react more to the threat as the victims in the texts were women. I also 
expect age to be important as younger people might be more concerned about their privacy on 
e.g. the Internet than older people and thus less approving of government surveillance. 
Approval rates might also be dependent on residential area as respondents who live in 
metropolitan cities or in rural farm areas probably are very unlikely to be equally affected by 
surveillance systems such as CCTV-cameras. I expect therefore rural areas to be more 
approving of surveillance as they tend to be exposed to it less. The information regarding 
respondents’ sex and age was collected from a previous run of the Citizen Panel from 
December 2015.  
 
I vilken typ av område bor du? 
Storstad: centralt (1), Storstad: ytterområde/förort (2), Stad: centralt (3), Stad: ytterområde 
(4), Större tätort (5), Mindre tätort (6), Ren landsbygd (7) 
4. Results and analysis 
The two different hypotheses require different forms of analyses. H1 is analyzed through 
comparison of means across the treatment groups on the three different surveillance systems. I 
also conduct a manipulation check to see whether the treatment gave any effect. Finally I 
check whether women in the treatment groups have reacted differently to the threat than men. 
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For H2 I present a correlation table then conduct a linear regression which tests the original 
relationship between threat and approval, then add control variables and the suggested causal 
mechanisms of interpersonal trust and governmental trust.  
 
4.1. Geographical proximity 
Graph 1a presents the distribution of the means, standard deviations and number of 
respondents regardless of experimental group on the approval rates of CCTV (for the other 
two systems see graphs 1b and 1c in Appendix A).  
 
 
The bell-shaped curve shows what the distribution would have looked like if it was normal. 
Instead, the histogram is heavily skewed which indicates that the respondents to a large extent 
are more approving than disapproving of CCTV-surveillance. The other two systems also 
show a symmetric bell-shaped normal curve which is more fitted to the data of the histogram 
which shows a higher degree of normality. For H1 this is not such a big problem as the one-
way ANOVA is quite robust to non-normally distributed data. For H2 it is more problematic, 
especially as the degree of normality differs between the systems. This could be offset by 
transforming the data but lack of time has prevented me from doing this.  
 
Before reporting how the actual treatment and control groups answered I must first check 
whether the random assignment was successful. This is done in table 1 through comparing the 
means across the following control variables: the respondents’ sex, age and residential area.  
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If the random assignment was successful no statistically significant differences should be seen 
across the treatment groups. 
 
Table 1 shows a higher response rate in the control group than in the treatment groups. This is 
expected as the control group did not read the newspaper article first. In order to test whether 
these differences are statistically significant I have conducted a one-way ANOVA. This 
requires homogeneity of variance between the groups as shown by the Levine statistic 
(Pallant, 2013). This test has been done for each ANOVA analysis throughout the paper and 
in cases where the assumption was violated I have done the robust tests of equality of means 
(Welch and Brown-Forsythe). As any differences between these tests and the p-values from 
the ANOVA were negligent I will only present the values from the one-way ANOVA tests. 
The one-way ANOVA for table 1 shows no statistically significant differences between the 
groups which indicates that the random assignment was successful.
4
   
 
Graph 2a presents a boxplot of the approval rates between the groups on CCTV-surveillance. 
The other surveillance systems show similar boxplots (see graphs 2b and 2c in Appendix A). 
The boxplot shows the distribution of means across all groups where the whiskers show the 
highest and lowest values. It also shows whether there are any outliers which might affect the 
results.  
                                                     
4
 Respondents’ sex: (F(3)=1.698 p=.165). Respondents’ age: (F(3)=1.079 p=.406). Residential area: (F(3)=.361 
p=.781) 
Table 1: Check for random assignment by means of control variables in treatment and control groups. Standard 
deviations in parentheses. Number of respondents (N) is also presented. 
 Control Egypt Germany Sweden Total 
Sex 
1.51 
(0.500) 
N=710 
1.52 
(0.500) 
N=665 
1.56 
(0.496) 
N=650 
1.52 
(0.500) 
N=631 
1.53 
(0.499) 
N=2656 
Age 
46.9901 
(14.80779) 
N=710 
47.7218 
(14.63726) 
N=665 
46.3354 
(15.3590) 
N=650 
46.9334 
(14.69787) 
N=631 
46.9996 
(14.79531) 
N=2656 
Residential area 
3.57 
(2.042) 
N=709 
3.59 
(2.046) 
N=662 
3.64 
(2.002) 
N=648 
3.53 
(2.014) 
N=626 
3.58 
(2.026) 
N=2645 
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Note: Control: N=709, Egypt: N=660, Germany: N=643, Sweden: N=627 
 
Graph 2a shows that the means of CCTV-surveillance is very similar across all treatment and 
control groups along with the same outlier. The long tails indicates high variability in the 
answers and the line within the box shows that the mean is very high and close to the highest 
end of the measurement-scale. Graphs 2b and 2c in Appendix A present similar results. The 
boxplot indicates that there is no difference in approval rates between the treatment and 
control groups. It also indicates that there is no difference between the treatment groups 
regarding proximity between the threat and the respondent. The distribution of the means 
along with the standard deviations is also presented in table 2.  
Table 2: Means of approval of government surveillance across treatment and control groups. Standard 
deviations in parentheses. Number of respondents (N) is also presented.  
 CCTV-surveillance Cellphone-surveillance Internet-surveillance 
Control 
5.63 
(1.643) 
N=709 
4.60 
(1.814) 
N=709 
4.32 
(2.043) 
N=709 
Egypt 
5.53 
(1.711) 
N=660 
4.62 
(1.791) 
N=660 
4.35 
(2.039) 
N=660 
Germany 
5.62 
(1.671) 
N=644 
4.61 
(1.854) 
N=644 
4.44 
(2.074) 
N=643 
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The one-way ANOVA shows that there are no statistically significant differences in means 
between the groups.
5
 This renders a post-hoc test unnecessary as that would tell us which of 
the groups differed from each other. Overall this non-result indicates that the treatment did not 
follow my hypothesis of proximity between the respondent and the threat. 
 
Disregarding the lack of statistical significance, the table contradicts my hypothesis as the 
control group has the highest approval rates of CCTV-surveillance, the Egyptian group most 
accepting of cellphone-surveillance and the German group most accepting of Internet-
surveillance. The Swedish treatment group is the least in favor of an increase in Swedish 
government surveillance across all three surveillance methods.  
 
Whether the treatment gave any effect on the treatment groups is analyzed through a 
manipulation check. As stated before I expect worry about being subjected to crime decrease 
as geographical distance increase with the lowest mean scores of worry in the control group. 
The comparison of means regarding worry about crime between the groups show that the 
mean score is the lowest in the Swedish group, followed by the control group, the German 
group with the highest worry-scores in the Egyptian group (see column “Total” in table 5 
Appendix B). The one-way ANOVA show no statistically significant differences between the 
groups.
6
 
 
As stated earlier women might react differently than men to the threat in the treatment. I 
expect women to have higher approval rates than men as the victims of the threat were 
women. I have isolated the respondents based on their sex in each treatment and control group 
and redone the previous analysis (table 6 in Appendix B). The analysis shows that women are 
more approving of CCTV than men. There is, however, a more mixed trend regarding the 
other two systems where men in general had higher mean scores for cellphone- and Internet-
surveillance, although not statistically significant.  
                                                     
5
 CCTV-surveillance (F(3)=.658 p=.578). Cellphone-surveillance (F(3)=.056 p=.983). Internet-surveillance 
(F(3)=.566 p=.637). 
6
 Worry regarding crime between the experiment groups: (F(3)=.308 p=.819) 
Sweden 
5.53 
(1.641) 
N=627 
4.59 
(1.821) 
N=627 
4.31 
(2.043) 
N=627 
Total 
5.58 
(1.666) 
N=2640 
4.60 
(1.819) 
N=2640 
4.36 
(2.049) 
N=2639 
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Women have higher approval rates in the treatment groups than in the control group which 
indicate that they are affected by the threat. This is, however, not true for the Swedish 
treatment group who again show means lower than the control group. The analysis also shows 
that across all surveillance systems men have higher approval rates in the control group than 
in the treatment groups (the only exception is cellphone-surveillance which has the highest 
means in the Swedish treatment group). This indicates that men are less approving of 
surveillance after being predisposed to a threat of sexual assaults. Noteworthy is that the one-
way ANOVA still does not show any statistically significant differences between the 
treatment groups when they are divided by the respondents’ sex.7 
 
The manipulation check regarding worry about crime when isolating the respondents’ sex 
(table 5 in appendix B) shows that women have the higher means of worry after receiving the 
treatment (with the highest score in Egypt then Germany and Sweden concluding with the 
control group). For men we can see the opposite, that their means of worry are lower in the 
treatment groups than in the control group. This indicates that women are more affected by 
the treatment than men. However, the one-way ANOVA shows no statistically significant 
differences in worry regarding crime between the groups when isolating respondents’ sex. 8 
 
4.2. Interpersonal and governmental trust 
The results regarding H2 are presented through a correlation table and then a linear regression 
table in order to predict the dependent variable based on the values of the independent 
variable. Since H2 is not about cause and effect there is no need to keep the variation in the 
independent variable. I have therefore combined those who got any treatment (the three 
treatment groups) into one variable to contrast against those who did not get any treatment at 
all (the control group). In order to conduct these analyzes the categorical variables is recoded 
into dichotomous variables (“dummy variables”) as follows: threat in treatment group (1) and 
control group (0), interpersonal trust is an interval ratio-variable between low (1) and high (7), 
trust in municipal government as no or little trust including no opinion (0) and moderate to 
high trust (1), respondents’ sex with man (0) and woman (1), and residential area has 
combined the bigger cities into metropolitan areas (0) and the smaller cities or farmlands as 
                                                     
7
 WOMEN: CCTV-surveillance: (F(3)=.689 p=.559). Cellphone-surveillance: (F(3)=1.190 p=.312). Internet-
surveillance: (F(3)=2.469 p=.060). MEN: CCTV-surveillance: (F(3)=.685 p=.562). Cellphone-surveillance: 
(F(3)=.535 p=.658. Internet-surveillance: (F(3)=.658 p=.578) 
8
 WOMEN: worry regarding crime between experiment groups (F(3)=2.105 p=.098) 
MEN: worry regarding crime between experiment groups (F(3)=1.079 p=.357) 
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rural areas (1). As stated before the analysis is focused on trust in the municipal government 
but has conducted the same analysis for the other two governmental levels. 
 
The correlation in table 3 shows how the independent variables are correlated with the 
dependent variables. The correlation is measured using Pearson correlation which requires the 
data to satisfy the following conditions: normal distribution of all variables as well as linearity 
and homoscedasticity of the data (Pallant, 2013). I had originally measured this through 
normal Q-Q plots and scatterplots and found this to (weakly) satisfy the conditions. However, 
graph 2a show that there might not have been a normal distribution for CCTV-surveillance. 
Future research should therefore transform the data.  
 
Table 3: Correlations between independent and dependent variables with causal mechanisms and 
control variables.  
 CCTV-surveillance Cellphone-surveillance Internet-surveillance 
Threat 
 -0.018 
N=2640 
0.003 
N=2640 
0.010 
N=2639  
Interpersonal trust 
(high) 
 -0.198
***
 
N=2640 
-0.152
***
 
N=2640 
-0.188
***
 
N=2639  
Municipal 
governmental trust 
(high) 
 -0.119
***
 
N=2636 
-0.088
***
 
N=2636 
-0.106
***
 
N=2635  
Woman 
 0.054
**
 
N=2640 
-0.035 
N=2640 
-0.006 
N=2639  
Age 
 0.302
***
 
N=2640 
0.294
***
 
N=2640 
0.316
***
 
N=2639  
Rural area 
 0.098
***
 
N=2638 
0.055
**
 
N=2638 
0.095
***
 
N=2637  
*** p ≤ 0.001 ** p ≤ 0.01 * p ≤ 0.05 
 
Table 3 show that there is no statistically significant correlation between perceiving a threat 
and approval of government surveillance. Additionally, the correlation coefficient is close to 
zero which indicates that there is no relationship between the variables. The table also shows 
that there is a statistically significant difference between the causal mechanisms and control 
variables on government surveillance approval. This suggests that the variables chosen are 
important when explaining approval of government surveillance. As expected the variable of 
interpersonal trust has a negative correlation coefficient which gives some evidence to H2 
where low trust in others leads to a higher approval rate of government surveillance. The 
negative correlation in trust in municipal government is also found when re-analyzing with 
trust in cabinet and trust in parliament, also coded as high (1) and low/no opinion (0). This 
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gives support to Huddy et al.’s (2003) argument that a decrease in people’s governmental trust 
forces governments to increase their security measures which would increase fearful 
individual’s approval rates.  
 
Interestingly the respondents’ sex is only statistically significant when it comes to CCTV-
surveillance, with almost no relationship regarding Internet-surveillance. Noteworthy 
(although not shown in the table) is the high correlation in between the surveillance systems, 
between CCTV and cellphone (0.606
***
), CCTV and Internet (0.632
***
), cellphone and 
Internet (0.813
***
). This indicates that the respondents who approve of one system to a large 
extent also tend to approve of the other systems.  
 
The correlation is not enough as it cannot be used to make predictions on the dependent 
variable based on the values of the independent variable. Table 4 thus shows the linear 
regressions between the variables. Model 1 shows only the original relationship, model 2 
includes the control variables and model 3 and 4 adds the mediating variables. My hypothesis 
is based on the initial relationship between threat and approval, and when adding the 
mediating variables the original relationship should fall away and no longer be statistically 
significant. 
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*** p ≤ 0.001 ** p ≤ 0.01 * p ≤ 0.05 
 
Table 4: Linear regression between perceiving a threat to national security and approval of government surveillance with control variables and causal mechanisms. 
Unstandardized b-coefficients, standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Model 1 
Approval of government surveillance 
Model 2 
Approval of government surveillance with 
control variables 
Model 3 
Approval of government surveillance with 
interpersonal trust 
Model 4 
Approval of government surveillance with 
governmental trust  
 CCTV Cellphone Internet CCTV Cellphone Internet CCTV Cellphone Internet CCTV Cellphone Internet 
Threat 
-0.069 
(0.073) 
0.010 
(0.080) 
0.045 
(0.090) 
-0.064 
(0.070) 
0.007 
(0.076) 
0.044 
(0.085) 
-0.083 
(0.068) 
-0.009 
(0.075) 
0.022 
(0.084) 
-0.060 
(0.069) 
0.010 
(0.076) 
0.050 
(0.085) 
Interpersonal 
trust (high) 
      
-0.232*** 
(0.020) 
-0.196*** 
(0.022) 
-0.268*** 
(0.024) 
   
Municipal 
governmental 
trust (high) 
         
-0.426*** 
(0.069) 
-0.332*** 
(0.076) 
-0.456*** 
(0.085) 
Woman    
0.165** 
(0.062) 
-0.141* 
(0.068) 
-0.040 
(0.076) 
0.195** 
(0.060) 
-0.115 
(0.067) 
-0.006 
(0.074) 
0.175** 
(0.061) 
-0.136* 
(0.068) 
-0.035 
(0.075) 
Age    
0.033*** 
(0.002) 
0.036*** 
(0.002) 
0.043*** 
(0.003) 
0.034*** 
(0.002) 
0.037*** 
(0.002) 
0.044*** 
(0.003) 
0.033*** 
(0.002) 
0.036*** 
(0.002) 
0.043*** 
0.003 
Rural area    
0.202** 
(0.067) 
0.053 
(0.074) 
0.222** 
(0.082) 
0.151* 
(0.066) 
0.010 
(0.073) 
0.163* 
(0.081) 
0.199** 
(0.067) 
0.045 
(0.073) 
0.217** 
(0.087) 
Constant 
5.630*** 
(0.063) 
4.597*** 
(0.068) 
4.597*** 
(0.068) 
4.262*** 
(0.149) 
2.957*** 
(0.130) 
2.264*** 
(0.145) 
4.997*** 
(0.147) 
3.857*** 
(0.163) 
3.495*** 
(0.181) 
4.049*** 
(0.119) 
3.048*** 
(0.131) 
2.389*** 
(0.146) 
R
2
 (adjusted) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.096 0.087 0.101 0.140 0.113 0.140 0.109 0.093 0.111 
N 2640 2640 2639 2638 2638 2637 2638 2638 2637 2634 2634 2633 
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Table 4 shows no initial relationship between the independent and dependent variable across 
any of the surveillance systems. Adding the causal mechanisms does not change that. Again, 
interpersonal trust interacts with the dependent variables as expected with a statistically 
significant negative slope. Again, governmental trust shows a negative beta-coefficient which 
is true regardless of which level of governmental trust is analyzed.  
 
Concerning the control variables we can see that the respondents’ sex is statistically 
significant in CCTV-surveillance where women have higher approval rates. The 
unstandardized B-coefficient is negative for women in the other systems which indicate that 
men have higher approval rates regarding those than women. The statistical significance 
varies between the systems. Age has a positive statistically significant slope through all the 
models which indicates that older citizens tend to want more surveillance than younger 
citizens. Residential area too shows positive values which indicate that living in rural areas 
makes people more approving of government surveillance, especially CCTV- and Internet-
surveillance.  
5. Discussion 
The experiment for H1 showed no statistically significant differences between the groups. 
Disregarding this, Sweden consistently reported the lowest approval rates across all systems, 
contradicting my hypothesis based on the psychological theories of emotional responses to a 
threat. This seems to indicate that geographical proximity is not important in surveillance 
studies. However as the choice of countries used in the treatment were unable to be based on 
any previous suggestions regarding distance the variable might simply be miscalculated.  
 
The manipulation check in H1 shows no statistically significant differences in worry 
regarding crime between the groups which suggests that the threat (or the variable for the 
manipulation check) was unsuitable. This contradicts earlier research (Huddy et al., 2003; 
Schlenger et al., 2002; Thoresen et al. 2012) regarding the relationship between perceiving a 
threat and becoming more scared for one’s own safety. As there were notable (although not 
statistically significant) differences between the sexes regarding being subjected to crime after 
the treatment I argue that the threat used in the treatment might not be extensive enough to 
warrant more surveillance. It is not a case of life or death for the individual or as 
disconcerting to public security to the same extent as e.g. terrorism which the theoretical 
framework is often referring to. The incidents here used to operationalize “threat to public 
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security” might thus simply not correlate with approval for government surveillance. Another 
reason for the threat not resulting in the preferred conclusions might be due to the theory of 
normalizing the exceptional. The constant reports regarding sexual assaults might have dulled 
the public’s sense of actually perceiving the threat as something out of the ordinary. If 
perceiving this threat as exceptional they would, according to my hypothesis, fear for their 
own safety more and be more approving of government surveillance.  
 
Additionally, despite the probability that Sweden shares the characteristics of low approval 
rates but high actual levels of government surveillance with other countries, it might be that 
Sweden is not the typical case. The relationship and variables tested here might hold better for 
some other country with other characteristics than Sweden.   
 
In order to refer to the real-life threat the circumstances and the year differed between the 
treatment texts. CLT indicates that distance in time also affects an individual’s understanding 
of the event. Although there were no statistically significant differences to indicate that this 
was the case future replications of the experiment could try to not vary this between the 
groups. As the events used in the treatment was heavily discussed in the media earlier this 
year my results might be affected by the respondents’ earlier knowledge. However as there 
were no statistically significant differences between the treatment and control groups 
regarding their means of surveillance approval this seems unlikely.  
 
Regarding H2 I was unable to test interpersonal and governmental trust as causal 
mechanisms. Here the reason for the non-result is more clear-cut as the three treatment groups 
were combined in order to contrast with the control group. This therefore omits the variation 
of geographical distance in the independent variable. Earlier research done in a Swedish 
context (Bjereld & Oscarsson, 2014) suggests that there should be a relationship between 
threat and approval, however done with a different threat than mine. My results thus suggest 
that the threat of sexual assaults is too weak to warrant more government surveillance. Since 
much of the previous surveillance studies have focused on the unlikely event of terrorism I 
argue that this is still an important finding as the relationship should be studied with more 
common types of threats, although still exceptional on a large scale.  
 
Another possible explanation for the non-results is the design and execution of my analyses. 
The distribution graphs showed that the data was not fully normally distributed which might 
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have affected the answers from the linear regression. Due to lack of time I was unable to 
transform the data. Future research should make sure of this and retry the analyses.  
 
An interesting result from H2 is the negative correlation and beta coefficient between 
governmental trust and approval of government surveillance without the threat being 
statistically significant for the relationship. The variable was coded as high trust (1) and 
everything else (0), a possible critique might be as to why I included the scores for no 
opinion. However, the by far highest selected option was the “neither high nor low trust” 
which makes it unreasonable to exclude from the analysis. As a comparison I followed this 
recoding and redid the analysis where the negative result still remained (although some other 
significant results fell out of the analysis). The negative correlation support Huddy et al.’s 
(2003) study that a decrease in people’s governmental trust forces governments to increase 
their security measures which would increase fearful individual’s approval rates. But if there 
is no threat as a catalyst to create fear for the individual this relationship makes less sense. 
Why would lower trust in the government yield higher approval rates of government 
surveillance? In other terms, this indicates that when the respondents for whatever reason 
have an increase in their governmental trust they see no reason for government surveillance. 
The results, however, reflect those from the SOM-institute (Bjereld & Oscarsson, 2014) that 
Swedes have generally low approval rates of government surveillance. Possible explanations 
could be that they trust the government to solve crimes by other means or prescribe to the 
notion of surveillance as something of an organizational purpose. An increase in 
organizational structure would be increasingly necessary if the respondents did not think of 
their government as competent and distrustful. This result should be tested further. 
 
H2 also shows that older respondents tend to favor government surveillance across all 
different systems. This could be because they are more concerned about the national security 
and have more patriotic feelings than younger respondents or that they might prescribe to a 
more neutral (or positive) view of surveillance necessary for organizational purposes. Another 
possible explanation is that younger respondents might be more concerned about their privacy 
on e.g. Internet than older respondents which makes them more concerned about government 
surveillance across all systems (and thus prescribes to the negative view of surveillance as 
something oppressive and intrusive).  
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H2 also show that residential area is important where respondents living in more rural areas 
tend to have higher approval rates across all three systems (although only statistically 
significant for CCTV- and Internet-surveillance). One explanation for this could be the fact 
that farmers rarely come across CCTV-cameras as they do not visit public spaces as 
frequently as residents in metropolitan areas. It is also possible that very remote areas do not 
have the same cellphone-coverage or Internet-access as the metropolitan areas which again 
would lead farmers to higher approval rates due to the low risk of being exposed to the 
surveillance.  
 
Both H1 and H2 show that there are differences in approval rates between the surveillance 
systems where CCTV-surveillance consistently have higher means across the treatment 
groups, when isolating the groups by the respondents’ sex and in the linear regression. This 
result is thus in accordance with previous research (see Bjereld & Oscarsson, 2014) and 
warrants the separate analysis throughout the paper. A possible explanation for this mixed 
result might be the fact that CCTV is a more general form of surveillance of a public space 
whereas the other two are more targeted to one individual (even if done on a large scale). 
Perhaps CCTV thus feels less intrusive than the other two (conditional on believing 
surveillance as something inherently oppressive). The results from both H1 and H2 also show 
that women are more in favor of CCTV than men which could be because of the fact that 
cameras arguably can increase one’s sense of safety when moving in public spaces. Men on 
the other hand are (although not statistically significant) more approving of cellphone- and 
Internet-surveillance which could be because of its ability to single out specific targets.  
 
In order to fully confirm any of the suggested reasons for the non-result of the treatment, a 
new experiment should be conducted. I suggest adding two more treatment groups to the ones 
used here. One treatment group would hold the threat variable as constant as possible but 
remove any traces of the variable regarding geographical proximity. If there were no 
statistically significant differences between the previous experimental groups and the new 
group we could discard the variable of geographical proximity. The second new experiment 
group would have the same geographical context as e.g. the German text but with another 
type of threat e.g. terrorism. This would allow us hold the variable of geographical distance 
constant but vary the threat and thus discern whether the threat of sexual violence is enough to 
warrant more surveillance. If possible, the new experiment should also be held firstly with 
Swedish respondents and then with e.g. Norwegian respondents in order to discern whether 
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Swedish respondents differ from others in countries with similar characteristics. If we after 
this extensive testing still see no statistically significant results we can fully rule out the 
variables of geographical proximity and threat of sexual assault in the relationship between 
perceiving a threat and wanting more government surveillance. This would also allow us to 
generalize the results more.  
6. Conclusions 
The research question that this paper has sought to answer was “How and in what way are 
perceived threats to public security correlated with the approval of surveillance methods such 
as CCTV, cellphone- and Internet surveillance?” which I have studied by testing whether the 
relationship is modified by geographical proximity (H1) and whether the causal mechanism 
for the relationship is interpersonal or governmental trust (H2). 
 
The experiment shows no statistically significant differences in means regarding approval of 
any of the three government surveillance systems between the treatment groups. Contrary to 
my hypothesis of proximity between the threat and the respondent (H1), the Swedish 
treatment group gave the lowest mean scores across all surveillance systems (although not 
statistically significant). This could indicate that contrary to previous studies and 
psychological theories, geographical proximity is not important for the relationship. CCTV 
constantly differs from the other two systems with higher mean scores across all treatment 
groups. When dividing the treatment groups depending on the respondents’ sex we could see 
that women were more in favor of CCTV than men, and (although not statistically significant) 
that men wanted more cellphone-and Internet-surveillance than the women. This is also true 
for H2 and warrants the separate analysis of the surveillance systems.  
 
In terms of a manipulation check there were no statistically significant differences between 
the treatment groups according to worry about being subjected to crime which suggests that 
the treatment was too weak. Between the sexes, however, women were more affected by the 
threat than men as expected since the victims of the treatment were women.  
 
The data from the experiment show no relationship between a threat to national security and 
approval of government surveillance in the linear regression and I was thus unable to test 
interpersonal trust or governmental trust as causal mechanisms (H2). This contradicts earlier 
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research (e.g. Davis & Silver, 2004; Bjereld & Oscarsson, 2014) and indicates that the threat 
used in the treatment did not give the intended effect.  
 
There is a very high correlation in between the surveillance systems which indicates that the 
respondents who approve of one system to a large extent also tend to approve of the other 
systems. Both the correlation table and the linear regression also show that older respondents 
are more approving of government surveillance across all three systems. The same result can 
also be seen for residential area where more rural areas tend to be more approving of 
government surveillance.  
 
One of the more surprising results from this study is the negative correlation and beta-
coefficient for governmental trust on approval of government surveillance. This supports 
Huddy et al.’s (2003) study, but without the connection to a threat which catalysts fear in the 
respondents this makes less sense and should be tested further.  
 
Overall my study has contributed with testing a non-terrorist threat with approval for 
government surveillance and given more attention to the variable of geographical proximity 
than surveillance studies before this one. As I failed to find the relationship between threat 
and approval I was unable to test the suggested causal mechanisms. However, like all 
experiments mine needs to be replicated in order to fully rule these hypotheses. Replications 
will also increase the generalizability and the internal and external validity of my study. By 
adding two more treatment groups we could be more certain of which variables is 
unimportant, the threat or the proximity. It is possible that another type of threat in the 
treatment would give results that followed my hypotheses.  
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Table 5: Manipulation check with means of worry regarding crime between the treatment groups divided by the respondents’ 
sex. Standard deviations in parentheses. Number of respondents (N) also presented. 
 Women Men Total 
Control 
3.27 
(1.611) 
N=351 
3.24 
(1.637) 
N=357 
3.26 
(1.623) 
N=708 
Egypt 
3.58 
(1.646) 
N=316 
3.06 
(1.620) 
N=347 
3.31 
(1.651) 
N=663 
Germany 
3.48 
(1.671) 
N=281 
3.16 
(1.649) 
N=366 
3.30 
(1.665) 
N=647 
Sweden 
3.43 
(1.613) 
N=298 
3.05 
(1.658) 
N=329 
3.23 
(1.646) 
N=627 
Total 
3.43 
(1.636) 
N=1246 
3.13 
(1.641) 
N=1399 
3.27 
(1.645) 
N=2645 
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Table 6: Comparison of means of approval of government surveillance between the treatment groups divided by the respondents’ 
sex. Standard deviations in parentheses. Number of respondents (N) is also presented. 
 CCTV-surveillance Cellphone-surveillance Internet-surveillance 
 Women Men Women Men Women Men 
Control 
5.67 
(1.527) 
N=350 
5.60 
(1.750) 
N=359 
4.49 
(1.801) 
N=350 
4.70 
(1.823) 
N=350 
4.21 
(1.949) 
N=350 
4.43 
(2.127) 
N=359 
Egypt 
5.67 
(1.621) 
N=315 
5.41 
(1.783) 
N=345 
4.63 
(1.821) 
N=315 
4.61 
(1.765) 
N=345 
4.48 
(2.026) 
N=315 
4.23 
(2.047) 
N=345 
Germany 
5.78 
(1.505) 
N=280 
5.49 
(1.781) 
N=364 
4.63 
(1.785) 
N=280 
4.60 
(1.908) 
N=364 
4.53 
(1.961) 
N=279 
4.38 
(2.156) 
N=364 
Sweden 
5.59 
(1.559) 
N=298 
5.48 
(1.713) 
N=329 
4.40 
(1.758) 
N=298 
4.75 
(1.864) 
N=329 
4.18 
(1.992) 
N=298 
4.42 
(2.085) 
N=329 
Total 
5.68 
(1.554) 
N=1243 
5.50 
(1.757) 
N=1397 
4.54 
(1.793) 
N=1243 
4.66 
(1.840) 
N=1397 
4.34 
(1.986) 
N=1242 
4.37 
(2.105) 
N=1397 
